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Introduction 
 
‘We should have studied the rich.’  
- Erving Goffman 
 
Rumour has it these were Goffman’s last words. Whether or not the rumour is true, the wry 
disappointment, the acknowledgement of a missed opportunity, continues to haunt the social 
sciences today.  
On the one hand, wealth and its production have obviously been an overarching, if not 
the defining preoccupation of the social sciences since the nineteenth-century onwards, from 
Marx and Weber through to theorists such as Veblen and Bourdieu. That preoccupation 
clearly animates social scientists today. Compelling articles within economic anthropology 
have explored how the promise of future wealth through immersion in global circuits of 
capital can generate unexpected political alliances and hopes (Miyazaki 2006); reveries of 
untapped resources can both invigorate and deflate a populace regardless of whether dreams 
of wealth are realized or not (Weszkalnys 2011).  
And yet, the lived experiences of the wealthy – as well as how they earn and 
maximize their wealth – often remains inscrutable, veiled from investigation thanks to the 
rich shielding themselves and their money through gated enclaves or offshore tax havens.   
There have been notable exceptions to the lacuna of sociological studies on the 
political economy of wealth and the lived experiences of the rich, in particular from scholars 
such as Scott (1996), Domhoff (1979), and Keister (2005), to name just a few. There is also 
growing attention to the importance of elites in poor and middle-income economies (see 
Whitfield and Buur 2014). Despite these efforts, attention to the global wealthy has not kept 
pace with the vast attention paid to poverty, deprivation and the lives of the global poor – a 
neglect that scholars such as Mike Savage, Karel Williams and Andrew Sayer have 
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emphasized, suggesting, in Savage and Williams’ memorable phrase, that elites have been 
‘remembered in capitalism and forgotten by social science’ (Savage and Williams 2008: 1; 
Sayer 2012). Savage and Williams argue that methodological preoccupations have 
entrenched this neglect – especially a longstanding use of national sample surveys which 
were incapable of capturing the lifestyles and sources of wealth of an ultra-elite segment of 
the rich who through the 1980s and 1990s were obscured as a result of their relative 
invisibility in national surveys.  
Neglect of the underlying causal factors of growing wealth concentration is even more 
marked when one looks outside sociology to mainstream economic theory. As a number of 
heterodox and mainstream economists have underscored recently, the problem of wealth 
concentration largely ceased being a primary focus of mainstream economists from the 1950s 
onwards (see Piketty 2014; Wisman 2013). One reason in economics for this neglect is 
disciplinary tension among those specializing in microeconomics versus macroeconomics. 
Economists such as James Galbraith have pointed out that most discussions of inequality 
from the mid-century onwards tended to focus on individual-level characteristics in order to 
explain inequality, suggesting that factors such as uneven access to higher education play the 
strongest role in growing wealth divides. It is only more recently, as marked patterns of 
inequality grow more pronounced across the world, that economists have begun to treat 
inequality as classical and early neoclassical economists once did – as a problem rooted in 
political economy (Galbraith 2014).  
One challenge making it harder to develop a full picture of global wealth inequality is 
the fact that each type of methodology for measuring wealth has its own distinctive 
weaknesses and strengths, and any methodological approach purporting to offer a conclusive 
understanding of global wealth divides is plagued by the problem of known uncertainties 
over the quality of global wealth statistics (Keister and Moller 2000; Piketty 2014). 
Thomas Piketty’s emergence as a celebrity economist bearing some of the most 
comprehensive data sets on global inequality ever compiled has therefore been timely and 
tenuous at the same time. As soon as his stardom seemed granted it was imperilled by the 
very thing that earned him global accolades: the quality of his data.  
In this article, I take recent debates over Piketty’s wealth data as an inspiration in 
order to consider two related questions. First, why did attention to wealth disparities cease to 
be a major preoccupation of neoclassical economic theory during the twentieth century, and 
what role did dominant theories of income distribution play in this neglect? Secondly, how 
can attention to ‘absent’ data help to shed light on the limits and advantages of Piketty’s 
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current argument – that levels of inequality are troubling, unjust and likely to exacerbate 
global strife unless reined through redistributive policy measures?    
The article has two main sections. In the first half, I turn to an almost forgotten late-
nineteenth-century debate over income distribution – a debate that was launched when John 
Bates Clark, an influential US economist, introduced his marginal theory of income 
distribution. This debate, which pitted incipient ‘neoclassical’ thinkers against more 
historically oriented political economists – does not get mentioned much by social scientists 
today. And yet, attending to its nature, scope and implications is, I suggest, vital for 
understanding some of the limits and strengths of Piketty’s argument.  
In the second half, I explore recent challenges to the robustness of Piketty’s wealth 
data. I suggest that situating those recent data challenges next to my earlier discussion of 
Clark’s work helps to underscore a problem facing not simply Piketty but neoclassical 
scholars more generally. That problem is the displacement of earlier, nineteenth-century 
preoccupations with illegitimate rent extraction, and the related absence of data tracking 
different forms of ‘earned’ versus ‘unearned’ income. Data in this case are not simply 
missing: they have never been of mainstream interest and never come into existence, thus 
remaining shadows of potential, unrealised research trajectories. 
 
A fair wage for a fair day’s pay? 
 
One of the most vexing questions facing US academic economists at the turn of the twentieth 
century was the question of whether the industrial market economy that had flourished over 
the previous century in British and the United States was morally defensible or not. From the 
end of the US war of independence in the late eighteenth century to the start of the twentieth 
century, the US economy underwent a rapid transition from a primarily agricultural economy 
to a developed industrial one. Both socialists and laissez-faire proponents alike were acutely 
aware that the gains of industrialization were not reaped equally by capital-owners and 
labourers.  
 The most outspoken critics of the distribution of economic gains under advanced 
industrialisation were obviously Marxist thinkers. But increasingly non-socialist thinkers 
joined in the denunciation of the rapidly expanding market economy. The most notorious of 
these was Henry George, a self-taught economist who is little known today but who was once 
one of the most popular writers of the late nineteenth century – when he died in 1897, over 
100,000 mourners gathered in the street of New York to pay their respects at his funeral, the 
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largest number of congregants to amass since the death of Abraham Lincoln two decades 
earlier. 
George was not a socialist – he was a strong believer in the benefits of open trade. But 
he also thought that growing wealth concentration threatened the fair distribution of 
economic profits. Observing the rapid expansion of the oil and rail sectors, he pointed out in 
his bestselling book, Progress and Poverty, that while ‘some get an infinitely better and 
easier living… others find it hard to get a living at all’ (George 2012[1880]: 4). For many of 
his adherents, he offered an attractive middle terrain between socialism, on the one hand, 
popularized by union leaders such as Eugene Debs, and free trade on the other, with its 
famous proponents such as the industrialist Andrew Carnegie – the steel baron who supressed 
his workers’ right to unionize even as he built a philanthropic empire ostensibly aimed at 
lessening their poverty. 
In a climate of growing labour militancy and both surreptitious and overt efforts by 
industrialists to expunge unions from their factories, academic economists of the period were 
torn between their admiration for abstract theories of political economy handed down through 
Smith, and their growing recognition that labourers were not appeased by the maxims of 
Smith’s nineteenth-century apostles: thinkers such as Herbert Spencer who proclaimed that a 
labourer’s economic deprivation under industrialization was a natural, even munificent result 
of evolutionary development. ‘[It] seems hard that a labourer incapacitated by sickness from 
competing with his stronger fellows, should have to bear the resulting privations. It seems 
hard that widows and orphans should be left to struggle for life or death,’ Spencer proclaimed 
in his landmark book, Social Statics, published in 1850. ‘Nevertheless, when regarded not 
separately, but in connection with the interests of universal humanity, these harsh fatalities 
are seen to be full of the highest beneficence (Spencer 2012[1896]: 150).  
This line of thought might have been attractive to the industrialists of the day, but it 
was hardly palatable to working men, women and children.    
It was in this tense climate of debate over the morality of capital accumulation that 
John Bates Clark first devised his theory of the marginal productivity of income distribution. 
Today, Clark’s legacy is honoured through the John Bates Clark Medal – a highly prestigious 
award granted by the American Economic Association to American scholars under the age of 
40 who are viewed to have made significant contributions to the field. He is seen as one of 
the neoclassical pioneers of the marginalist revolution in economic thought – a period when 
economists shifted to a largely psychological, ‘subjective’ understanding of the value of 
different commodities, in contrast to the ‘objective’ labour theory of value held by Marxist 
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scholars and classical political economists such as Ricardo and Mill. Clark’s contributions to 
economics are celebrated through the medal in his honour.  But what is surprising and little 
known about his legacy is that a key aspect of his work – his theory of the marginal 
productivity of income distribution – was largely refuted even by Clark’s mainstream 
sympathizers, in particular George Stigler and Paul Samuelson. Curiously, the spirit and 
principle of his idea continues to be taught as orthodoxy within neoclassical macroeconomic 
theory despite longstanding challenges to its legitimacy. 
Clark was born in Rhode Island in 1847. He attended Amherst College, and then, like 
other notable scholars of his generation, spent time as a student in Germany, before returning 
to the US and eventually teaching at Columbia University. In his earliest work, he was 
sceptical of the role of market competition in allocating resources in a just manner. 
Unhampered competition, in his view, was not compatible with promoting societal ideals of 
good will. He later reversed this position, advocating something that he termed “potential 
competition” – the idea that if monopoly powers abuse their own position by raising prices 
above competitive levels, new competitors will take advantage of unnaturally high prices by 
offering more competitive rates. Clark’s influential argument helped to arm business interests 
against calls for stricter anti-trust polices (see Morgan 1993; Groenewegen 1999; Leonard 
2003; Fioriti 2012).  
Clark also developed a theory of income distribution that has since become a central 
pillar of neoclassical economic thought. Developed as a direct rebuttal of Marx’s theory of 
surplus value, Clark’s marginal productivity theory suggested that the owners of capital, on 
the one hand, and labourers, on the other hand, each receive an income that is directly 
proportionate to the amount of wealth that they create.  
Just over a decade after publishing The Philosophy of Wealth (1886) – an essay which 
lamented the corrosive effect of free market competition – Clark published The Distribution 
of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits (1899), a book which advanced a 
powerful defense of the profits earned by capital owners. 
In his introduction to this highly influential second book, Clark takes aim at Marx’s 
belief that workers are unfairly deprived of the full value of the product of their 
labour: The indictment that hangs over society is that of ‘exploiting labor.’ 
‘Workmen,’ it is said, ‘are regularly robbed of what they produce’… If this charge 
were proved, every right-minded man should become a socialist; and his zeal in 
transforming the industrial system would then measure and express his sense of 
justice (2012[1899]: 4). 
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Clark goes on to insist that not only is that charge unfounded – but that the exact opposite is 
the case:  
 
[T]he distribution of the income of society is controlled by a natural law, and…where 
natural laws have their ways, the share of income that attaches to any productive 
function is gauged by the actual product of it. In other words, free competition tends 
to give to labor what labor creates, to capital what capital creates (3). 
 
 This second passage of Clark’s helped to indoctrinate a sentiment that has become 
entrenched in neoclassical theories of distribution since: the idea that remuneration levels are 
an accurate reflection of one’s economic contribution.  
The first obvious target of Clark’s tract was Marxist thought. But he was also writing 
in response to the growing influence of Henry George. It is useful, thus, to understand the 
connection between George and Clark’s ideas in order the grasp the importance today of 
ongoing debates over the measurement of capital – in particular questions over whether some 
wealth is ‘earned’ rather than ‘unearned.’  
The main line of thought animating George’s Progress and Poverty – a book which 
sold millions of copies during the 1890s, second only to sales of the bible in the United States 
– is his concern that growing land shortages would lead wages throughout the nation to 
plummet. George realized that with the impending closure of the American frontier, workers 
were literally losing their bargaining leverage: they could not point to the existence of 
uncultivated land as a rationale for receiving better wages in urban regions (see Stabile 1995; 
Persky 2000).  
Why did George think that the erosion of land availability would inevitably lead to 
lower wages in non-agrarian regions?  
In George’s view, wages throughout the nation were set by what workers could earn 
for themselves if given the chance to cultivate their own plots of land. In determining what 
work they would accept, they could, in theory, consider other opportunities – such as the 
ability to homestead land themselves. George suggested that the general level of wages was 
therefore firmly anchored to the highest possible product that individuals could earn on what 
he called ‘no-rent’ land. The theoretical possibility of cultivating existing land reserves was 
thus, in George’s reading, a powerful restraint on the ability of capital to slash wage levels. 
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As the availability of surplus land shrank, George was certain that wages would necessarily 
fall.  
Clark was sympathetic to George’s argument. He thought that George’s general 
perception of the origin of wages was accurate. But where he differed was in the belief that 
the allocation of wages was unjust. Clark thought that George had described labour’s 
opportunity for increasing their own “marginal opportunity” – their ability to press for higher 
wages – too narrowly. Building on George’s thesis, he put forward a novel concept, a 
phenomenon that he termed the ‘zone of indifference.’ 
Clark suggested that a ‘zone of indifference’ could be found in virtually every 
industrial sector. It consisted of the surfeit of wasted or dilapidated materials of production, 
from outdated tools to poorly placed factories or mills – areas where the possibility for 
significant economic rents was limited due to the poor quality of materials but where, 
nonetheless, labour had the theoretical possibility of using such outdated materials in order to 
meet its own economic needs. This “zone of indifference” created, in his view, a sort of ad 
infinitum bargaining chip for the working classes. Clark believed that workers could always 
point to the existence of such depreciated goods as a rationale for receiving fair wages. From 
this observation, he derived the “natural law” of income distribution cited above: the idea, as 
he put it, that “where natural laws have their way…free competition tends to give to labor 
what labor creates, to capital what capital creates” (Clark 2012(1989): 3).  
Clark took pains to point out that such a model rarely holds true in practice. He 
emphasized that ‘frictions’ and other market imperfections ‘delayed the effects of the 
workings of static laws.’ But, as Morgan points out, this did not deter him from suggesting 
that under ideal conditions, labour had the same ability to receive economically justified 
financial rewards as capital-owners (see Morgan 1992: 31).  
This belief – that under ideal conditions, labourers receive an economic contribution 
that reflects their ‘natural’ contribution to the production process – is the founding kernel of 
marginal productivity theories of income distribution, theories which continue to be 
championed today as evidence that ‘wealth-creators’ deserve whatever windfalls they reap.  
A second repercussion of Clark’s notion is that his ‘law’ essentially extinguishes the 
problem of illegitimate rent-seeking by positing that under ideal market conditions, rent-
seeking cannot exist: all proceeds to capital-owners are a natural reflection of the economic 
contribution they have made. The spectre of rentier profiteering disappears – at least in 
theory.   
8 
 
What is remarkable about Clark’s theory – and why it is so relevant to debates over 
wealth distribution today – is that very few of his contemporaries or later generations of 
economists were, at face value, persuaded by it. Some of the fiercest criticism of Clark’s 
theory came from mid-twentieth-century Chicago School economists who felt that Clark’s 
theory was overly simplistic, and thus ceded too much ammunition to critics of neoclassical 
economics. The economist George Stigler, for example, has lamented the fact that Clark’s 
‘naïve productivity ethics’ could logically lead to a defence of Marxist economics: if workers 
managed to negotiate large pay-outs, Clark’s thesis could equally be used to support whatever 
gains they receive – economically efficient or not (Stigler 1980: 165). Stigler adds that one of 
the strongest criticisms of Clark came from Frank Knight, who published a refutation of 
Clark’s thesis in 1923. Stigler notes that one of Knight’s main concerns was that economic 
competition, far from being ethically ‘just’, often ‘distributes income largely on the basis of 
inheritance and luck’ (Stigler 1980: 166).  
Ever since the 1920s when Knight first expressed his reservations about Clark’s 
notion, leading neoclassical thinkers have called attention to the limits of Clark’s idea. One 
example is Paul Samuelson, the recipient of the first ever Bates Clark Medal, awarded to 
Samuelson in 1947. During that same year, Samuelson published his ground-breaking book, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis, which advanced the mathematical modelling of utility 
maximization in economic theory. In that volume, he raised concerns about the plausibility of 
Clark’s notion of income distribution (see Persky 2000). He reiterated those concerns a few 
years later, noting his own surprise that other scholars had not recognized the weaknesses in 
Clark’s formulation: ‘To my astonishment I find that the arbitrariness of J.B. Clark’s views 
on the deservingness of competitively determined rewards is not universally recognized’ 
(Samuelson 1966: 1577, quoted in Sen 1997: 101).  
Joseph Schumpeter raised similar concerns. In his History of Economic Analysis, 
Schumpeter makes his admiration of Clark’s contributions to marginal utility theories clear. 
But he also castigates Clark for conflating a theory of income distribution with a theory of 
morality. Clark’s problem, according to Schumpeter, is that he ‘asserted that distribution 
according to the ‘law’ of marginal productivity is ‘fair.’ And this, in the eyes of the 
[economics] profession…created an association between ‘Clarkian marginalism’ and 
capitalist apologetics’ (Schumpeter 1972 [1954]: 870). 
The main concern of neoclassical theorists, in summation, is that the naivety and 
arbitrariness of Clark’s theory made it easy for critics of marginalism to dismiss its 
explanatory power. And dismiss it they did. From scholars such as Joan Robinson onwards, 
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heterodox thinkers have mounted persuasiveness critics of the theory’s validity (Robinson’s 
argument is described in more depth in the next section). In some fields, these criticisms have 
been influential. As the heterodox economist Fred Moseley points out, they have led to the 
gradual elision of the notion of marginal productivity theories of income distribution from 
microeconomics textbooks (Moseley 2012: 115).   
 But the opposite is the case when it comes to macroeconomics, a field where, as 
Moseley has emphasized, scholars such as Gregory Mankiw, the author of the one of the 
most influential macroeconomic textbooks in the world, continue to the teach the principle of 
Clark’s notion of income distribution as if there was a general consensus in neoclassical 
economic theory about its validity. As I describe below, drawing on Mankiw’s writing, 
versions of Clark’s theory remain highly influential to this day, embedded throughout 
undergraduate macroeconomics teaching; influencing policymaking; and figuring in recent 
debates over the merits of Piketty’s criticisms of wealth inequality.  
Piketty’s work offers a useful lens to explore the ongoing influence of Clark’s notion. 
In this next section, I turn to Piketty’s work and debates he has raised, starting first with an 
introduction of Piketty’s main theoretical points, then a discussion of his data and its limits – 
before concluding with a discussion of the twin problems of income distribution and 
economic rent.   
 
Piketty and his critics  
To understand Piketty’s arguments about inequality, it is necessary to first examine how he 
defines capital: any form of wealth – including land wealth; housing assets; wages; dividends 
from shares in public owned companies; returns from patents on intellectual property – that 
have a current or a historical market value. In other words, his definition and measure of 
capital is a financial denomination based on the pricing or valuing of a good or service once it 
has been accorded a market price. 
This definition has a number of strengths. The first is that it is broad enough to allow 
him considerable scope for comparing varied sources of global inequality data – something 
that has historically been unavailable. Not simply because much wealth is hidden from sight 
in offshore tax havens, although that’s a major problem. But because different countries, 
different regions, and different historical periods have varied methods for collecting wealth 
data, and therefore data comparisons across different regions and historical periods are 
always bound to be limited and imperfect.  
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Piketty’s accomplishment is to bring together some of the most robust sources of 
wealth data available worldwide into one collective picture: from tax records, census data, 
inheritance and estate records he develops a robust corpus of evidence on wealth divides in 
some of the world’s largest and most influential national economies, with a focus on France, 
the UK, United States, and, to a lesser extent, Germany, Sweden, Japan and Canada. From 
this data, he’s able to estimate that returns to private capital exceed general economic growth 
levels to an extent that signals a return to nineteenth century levels of inequality.  
His definition of capital also has its weaknesses – two in particular – one of which has 
been readily acknowledged by Piketty and one of which largely hasn’t. This first is that 
Piketty’s definition of capital excludes ‘human capital’ – a broad term referring to the general 
store of less tangible assets such as social networks and educational opportunities that can be 
important to one’s life chances for social mobility but which Piketty necessarily excludes 
because he is restricting his analysis to things that be exchanged in global markets and 
therefore have a financial value. Piketty has conceded this point, effectively neutralizing it 
through accepting its accuracy: in an interview with media, he acknowledged that ‘human 
capital’ is key to inequality, adding – ‘next time I will write an even bigger book!”  
The second perceived limitation is that Piketty’s definition of capital is that it largely 
ignores treatments of capital from scholars such as Marx, Ricardo and Smith – scholars who 
came before the neoclassical turn. Piketty’s definition is firmly rooted in the neoclassical 
tradition. Why does this matter? Because his definition effaces questions of rent and unearned 
income that occupied Marx and his contemporaries (for excellent summary of controversies 
of the definition of capital in mainstream economics, see Cochrane 2011). 
One of the clearest illustrations of this limitation comes from the work of the 
economist James Galbraith. Like Piketty, Galbraith has been at the forefront of the small 
group of mainstream economists who have spent the past two decades calling attention to the 
problem of wealth disparities. And his findings are broadly similar to Piketty: inequality 
levels in wealthy nations have been rising steadily since the 1980s. But Galbraith and 
Piketty’s explanations for why inequality is growing are notably different.  
A 2014 review by Galbraith of Piketty’s book teases out these differences. 
Galbraith sees Piketty’s reliance on a neoclassical definition of capital as a serious 
limitation of his argument. He offers the example of Piketty’s assessments of the capital-
national income ratio in the Anglo-American world. Since the 1970s, the market value of 
capital assets has grown from an estimated 250-300 percent of national income in Anglo-
American nations combined, to 500-600 percent of national income. Piketty uses such figures 
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to underscore his argument that a small group of capital owners are increasingly capturing a 
disproportionate amount of national revenue. And yet, the problem is, as Galbraith 
underscores, rather than questioning where the rate of return to capital comes from in the first 
place, Piketty largely accepts prevailing neoclassical wisdom – inadvertently contributing to 
the neoclassical belief that income distribution largely reflects economic contribution.  
Although Piketty does often state that he thinks that marginal productivity theories of 
income distribution are crude (see, for example, pages 304 to 306 of Capital), he never 
explores their history. Crucially, Piketty ignores the fact that ever since Clark put forward his 
idea, marginal productivity theories of income distribution have been successfully refuted 
time and again by successive generations of thinkers – most successfully by a group of 
Cambridge-based scholars writing in the 1940s and 1950s, spearheaded by the economist 
Joan Robinson.  
Robinson’s criticism of marginal productivity theories of income remains highly 
relevant today. Writing in 1953, Robinson suggested that ‘The dominance in neo-classical 
economic teaching of the concept of a production function… has been a powerful tool of 
miseducation’ (Robinson 1953-54: 81). She saw marginal productivity theories of income 
distribution as a tautological illusion, with the end financial pay-out received by capital or 
labour used to defend the idea that the pay-out represented a ‘natural’ measure of one’s 
economic contribution. In a way, her criticism is not dissimilar to Stigler or Knight, although 
Robinson wrote from a leftist perspective, and Stigler and Knight did not.   
In Capital, Piketty briefly acknowledges Joan Robinson and her colleagues’ challenge 
to the neoclassical school’s definition of capital. He also occasionally points out throughout 
his book that neoclassical theories of income distribution are crude and limited; he allows, for 
example, for the strong role of luck in determining wealth distributions, an observation that 
echoes the earlier concerns voiced by Frank Knight.  
But despite offering occasional nods to the limits of marginal theories of income 
distribution, Piketty’s definition of capital ultimately strengthens the hand of the economic 
theorists who he aims to refute.   
The limitations of Piketty’s analysis are clear from a short passage in Capital where 
his mistakenly interprets the importance of Robinson’s criticism of marginal theorists. Piketty 
writes that ‘economists working in Cambridge, England…saw in [Robert] Solow’s model a 
claim that growth is always perfectly balanced, thus negating the importance Keynes had 
attributed to short-term fluctuations. It was not until the 1970s that Solow’s so-called 
neoclassical growth model definitively carried the day’ (Piketty 2014: 231).  
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Galbraith objects to Piketty’s take on Robinson and her colleagues for two important 
reasons. First, Piketty gets their main objections wrong. Robinson and her colleagues’ 
primary concern was not Solow’s treatment of Keynes’s writing on short-term fluctuations. 
Their primary argument centred on scepticism with neoclassical conceptions of capital and 
how it is measured and distributed. Second, Piketty gets the outcome of battle wrong. As 
Galbraith underscores: “Solow’s model did not carry the day. In 1966, Samuelson conceded 
the Cambridge argument!” (Galbraith 2014; see also Syll 2014). 
Why does this matter?  
Because by dismissing the importance of Robinson’s challenge to the marginal 
theorists, Piketty manages to entrench a false picture of both the stakes of the challenge and 
the end result. In doing so, he unintentionally undermines the very sort of policy mechanisms 
he explicitly calls for. Piketty proposes more taxation on the world’s highest earners, but he 
does not consider the possibility that their wealth was ill-earned in the first place. In other 
words, he implicitly sides with conservative economists whose views on inequality he 
ostensibly aims to contest.  
The best example of a conservative economist who Piketty inadvertently aligns 
himself with is Mankiw, a professor of macroeconomics at Harvard who drew headlines a 
few years ago when a group of Harvard students staged a walkout of his undergraduate 
economic modules; their aim was to express their solidarity with the Occupy movement and 
to criticise what they saw as Mankiw’s conservative bias in his economics teaching. I suggest 
that this bias is visible in two main areas: Mankiw’s macroeconomics textbooks and his 
scholarly writing in defence of wealth inequality. 
A survey of recent editions of Mankiw’s popular, intermediate-level textbook, 
Macroeconomics, underscores the aptness of Moseley’s observations of undergraduate 
economics teaching. Writing in 2012, Moseley points out that Mankiw’s bestselling textbook 
‘presents marginal productivity theory as if there were no logical problems whatsoever.’ 
It is an accurate observation. Mankiw’s 8th edition, published in 2013, does not 
mention Clark by name. But Mankiw adopts the precepts underpinning Clark’s idea, and 
even uses language that directly echoes Clark’s wording in The Distribution of Wealth. ‘If all 
firms in the economy are competitive and profit maximizing,’ Mankiw writes, ‘then each 
factor of production is paid its marginal contribution to the production process’ (2013: 55). 
He describes this approach as the neoclassical theory of distribution (italics are Mankiw’s), 
and states that this theory is ‘accepted by most economists today as the best place to start in 
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understanding how the economy’s income is distributed from firms to households’ (2013: 
49).  
Mankiw’s most recent 9th edition of his textbook, published in 2016, includes the 
exact same definition and wording as in the prior paragraph. But notably, directly following 
his definition of the neoclassical theory of distribution, Mankiw tacks on a discussion that is 
absent from his 8th edition – a section titled ‘the growing gap between rich and poor.’ In this 
section, Mankiw briefly addresses growing debates over widening income inequality, before 
concluding that growing income gaps are attributable predominantly to differences in 
education attainment. He adds that ‘some policymakers advocate a more redistributive system 
of taxes and transfers, to take from those higher on the economic ladder and give to those on 
the lower rungs. Such an approach treats the symptoms but not the underlying causes of 
rising inequality’ (2016: 65).  
Mankiw’s firm faith in the accepted and uncontroversial status of what he calls the 
‘neoclassical theory of distribution’ is not limited to textbooks: it pervades his highly cited 
peer-reviewed work. In a recent article, ‘Defending the one percent’, Mankiw invokes 
marginal theories of income distribution in order to defend growing wealth divides. Referring 
to such theories as the ‘economist’s standard framework,’ Mankiw argues that in a ‘standard 
competitive labor market, a person’s earnings equal the value of his or her marginal 
productivity’ (Mankiw 2013: 30, emphasis added).  
Mankiw does acknowledge that there may be occasional instances where, in his 
words, the ‘real world might deviate from this classical benchmark. If, for example, a 
person’s high income results from political rent-seeking rather than producing a valuable 
product, the outcome is likely to be both inefficient and widely viewed as inequitable.’ But he 
then goes on to insist that in nations such as the US, examples of political rent-seeking are 
rare. ‘My own reading of the evidence is that most of the very wealthy got that way by 
making substantial economic contributions, not by gaming the system or taking advantage of 
some market failure or the political process’ (Mankiw 2013: 30).   
Mankiw argues, in other words, that the ‘one percent’ earned their fortunes through 
the sheer dint of their hard work and economic contributions rather than from rent, something 
that he insists is likely to be rare. What Mankiw does not acknowledge is that the mainstream 
wording of this ‘standard framework’ can be traced to an economist, Clark, who insisted 
himself that his so-called ‘law’ only held under perfect conditions which rarely if ever 
appeared. Despite Clark’s own caveats, his notion is now ingrained in neoclassical 
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macroeconomics scholarship: taught and retaught to students as if it was an uncontested 
maxim.   
Clark took a major problem of his day – the question of why industrialists such as 
Carnegie were getting richer and richer while the wages of his labourers often stayed stagnant 
or rose only incrementally – and he invented an economic ‘law’ that was remarkably 
favourable to the wealthy: the idea that capitalists receive an economic pay-out that is 
proportionate to the economic value which they generate. It’s a powerful argument, one that’s 
understandably appealing to the rich. But as Robinson, Samuelson and Stigler each insisted: 
it’s also naïve and tautological.  
When Mankiw argues that according to the ‘economist’s standard framework,’ it is 
accepted that ‘a person’s earnings equal the value of his or her marginal productivity,’ he is 
appealing to the power of a refuted economic theory. He also raises an open-ended question 
which he does not have the data to answer – just how small or large a role does rent-seeking 
actually play in wealth divides?  
Rent-seeking is defined as the effort to procure economic rent (excess income paid to 
a factor of production) through favourably manipulative a legislative or a political 
environment rather than contributing directly to the production of economic value. Leading 
economists such as Robert Solow have recently suggested that political rent-seeking may be 
playing a growing and detrimental role in income allocation – a problem that Solow 
acknowledges is difficult to measure precisely because, in his words, there is ‘no direct 
measurement of rent in this sense’ (Solow 2015).   
In the passage cited above, Mankiw does admit that the problem of rent-seeking can 
lead to unfair outcomes. He points out that in situations where a ‘person’s high income results 
from political rent-seeking rather than producing a valuable product’ the outcome is typically 
seen as both ‘inefficient’ and ‘inequitable.’ But he hastens to add that such instances are rare. 
Is he justified in doing so? It is accurate for Mankiw to suggest that most wealth today 
results from individual effort and value creation, rather than politically engineered rent 
extraction?   
Unfortunately, that question is an unresolved and largely ignored one. Current 
economic tools and market-based estimates of wealth divides do not provide, as I show 
below, an answer to this question. This absence of appropriate tools of measurement makes it 
easy for someone like Mankiw to suggest that political rent-seeking is extremely rare. In 
reality, we do not know how rare or pervasive the problem of rent-seeking is in today’s 
advanced economies. Few mainstream economists seem encouraged to measure a problem 
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that orthodox theory suggests does not exist: a persistent source of ambiguity that is highly 
useful to thinkers such as Mankiw.   
 
Divisive data in plain sight  
 
How have conservative economists such as Mankiw managed to successfully withstand 
decades of persuasive challenges to marginal productivity theories? To address this question, 
my last section engages with debates over the quality and comprehensiveness of Piketty’s 
data on wealth distributions. While valuable, much of this debate has centred on efforts to 
track and to measure wealth after it reaches the hands of private individuals or corporations. 
Piketty’s data might, therefore, obscure understandings of inequality even as it purports to 
indict it.  
Vociferous debates over data that is publicly available tends to legitimate the belief 
that what matters most in studying wealth inequality is the painstaking effort to chart the 
visible dispersion of wealth, rather than to explore something that remains even more difficult 
to measure: the question of how much of that wealth was legitimately earned or not.   
 Early political economists were preoccupied with that question. Mill, Smith and 
Ricardo each saw the problem of economic rents as central to understanding economic 
transformation (Khan 2000; see also Sayer 2014; Milonakis and Fine 2008). But the 
neoclassical turn, in stark contrast to classical preoccupations, treats all income as equally 
productive. As a result, current statistical sources do not themselves distinguish between 
something classical economists once differentiated as ‘earned’ versus ‘unearned’ income. 
Michael Hudson is one of the few leading US economists to stress this point. As he notes, 
‘any accounting format reflects the economic theory that defines its categories.’ Given that 
the current neoclassical canon does not distinguish between earned and unearned income, 
neither do our statistical measures. Hudson goes on:   
Neither the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) nor the Internal Revenue 
Service’s Statistics on Income in the United States define the specific form that the 
wealth buildup takes…A byproduct of this value-free view of wealth is that Piketty 
suggests an equally value-free remedy for inequality: a global estate tax with a 
progressive wealth and income tax. Not only is this almost impossible to enforce 
politically, but a general tax on wealth or income does not discriminate between what 
is earned “productively” and what is squeezed out by rent extraction or obtained by 
capital gains (Hudson 2014: 123).  
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Hudson, like Galbraith, is making a considerably different point than most of Piketty’s 
interlocutors. Whether they agree or disagree with Piketty’s findings, many of his readers 
have emphasized a somewhat obvious but still important point: all data on wealth equality is 
affected by known difficulties in collecting reliable evidence. Nations differ in their historical 
attention to wealth divides; some countries have longer and more historically robust 
databases than others. Each type of methodology, from sample surveys, to national censuses, 
to tax returns, has its own weaknesses and strengths. The uncertain quality of wealth data 
raises interesting political implications in itself. Just as uncertainty over the effects of 
ecological change, industrial pollutants or genetically modified products can be politically 
useful in thwarting regulatory action (see author 2009), ongoing uncertainty over the 
reliability of wealth data helps to cosset elites against demands for change.  
But such uncertainty also veils a more deeply rooted problem: the fact that spirited 
nineteenth-century debates over the legitimacy of wealth have been silenced as a result of 
empirical models which suggest that, in efficient markets, the problem of unearned rent does 
not exist at all.  
 Let me offer two examples. This is not an exhaustive list, but it helps to highlight the 
areas where most criticism of Piketty’s data has focused on to date. One of the most well-
publicized criticisms has come from Chris Giles of the Financial Times, who suggested that 
Piketty seemed to have invented some figures, as well as cherry-picking data sources that 
favour his argument. Giles also charged Piketty with underestimating the importance of data 
from the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) Wealth and Assets survey, which Giles 
argued offers a more reliable and far less pessimistic picture of wealth divides in Britain than 
Piketty’s data (Giles 2014). 
Unfortunately for Giles, his suggestion that ONS data offers a clearer understanding 
of wealth patterns is widely seen as highly objectionable. The ONS Wealth and Asset Survey 
relies on household interviews. As sociologists have long pointed out, self-reported 
assessments of personal wealth tend to paint a self-serving picture of personal assets. As 
reported by The Independent, one of the UK’s leading daily newspapers, Piketty has called 
Giles’ suggestion ‘ridiculous,’ as ONS data is ‘based on self-reported data and is very low 
quality.’ Gabriel Zucman of the LSE makes the same point, also quoted in The Independent: 
“The FT seems to take that survey as gospel, and I think that’s a mistake’ (Armitage 2014).  
 The second main perceived limitation – discussed above – is Piketty’s failure to 
include human capital in his wealth estimates.  
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These two criticisms alone have fuelled dozens of headline-grabbing debates over the 
disciplinary tensions underpinning Piketty’s research. One recent survey carried out by the 
University of Chicago suggests that 81 percent of economists surveyed disagree with 
Piketty’s concept of r > g (his belief that wealth inequality is marked by growing returns to 
capital in disproportionate degree to overall national growth). Statistics like this, in turn, 
convey an image of economics as a realm of spirited dissensus, one where, for better or 
worse, it is difficult for any one theory or school to remain dominant for long.  
Debates over the merits of Piketty’s wealth data are, in a way, resonant of Bourdieu’s 
analysis of the Barthes-Picard Affair in France, a dispute that he draws on in order the 
demonstrate the ways that ostensible controversy can often solidify underlying disciplinary 
preoccupations rather than unsettle them. The Barthes-Picard affair was rooted in Barthes and 
Picard’s differing views on the writing of Racine. Despite their differences, their shared 
belief in the importance of studying Racine at all helped to cement perceptions of Racine’s 
importance, and the value of literary criticism as an intellectual field. Thus behind their 
ostensible dispute lay a particular complicity, ‘the consensus in dissensus which forms the 
unity of the intellectual field’ (Bourdieu 1966; Lane 2000: 73). In a similar manner, 
vociferous contestation over Piketty’s available data belies an underlying consensus, one that 
has grown more entrenched since the turn of the last century. That consensus is the 
neoclassical rejection of earlier concerns over rentier profits in favour of a Pollyanna-ish 
assumption that all wealth is equally productive and equally deserved. 
Interestingly, one of the few public figures to call attention to this problem is Bill 
Gates. In a recent review on Piketty’s book, Gates makes an argument similar to Hudson and 
Galbraith. He argues, rightly, that Piketty ‘doesn’t adequately differentiate among different 
kinds of capital with different social utility.’ Gates then goes on to suggest, in an interesting 
reversal of Galbraith and Piketty’s conclusions, that the problem of rentier exploitation 
condemned by nineteenth-century economists simply does not exist today:  
I fully agree that we don’t want to live in an aristocratic society in which already-
wealthy families get richer simply by sitting on their laurels and collecting what 
Piketty calls “rentier income” – that is, the returns people earn when they let others 
use their money, land, or other property. But I don’t think America is anything close 
to that. Take a look at the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest Americans. About half the 
people on the list are entrepreneurs whose companies did very well (thanks to hard 
work as well as a lot of luck)…I don’t see anyone on the list whose ancestors bought 
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a great parcel of land in 1780 and have been accumulating family wealth by collecting 
rents ever since.i 
 
There is a flaw in Gates’s argument. Economic rents are not defined as Gates defines 
them: as ‘returns people earn when they let others use their money, land or other property.’ 
Rents are defined as an excess of payment to a factor of production in excess of the cost 
needed to bring the factor into production. Such payments can accrue from the economic 
positioning of an asset, such as geographical land placement, that increases irrespective of 
any expenditure by an owner, as well as payments created through legal privileges, such as 
intellectual property rights. It is payment earned whenever a government or other party grants 
exclusive use of a factor of production through an artificial advantage such as a patent.  
Gates gets part of the problem right – he correctly points out that rents are rooted in 
the problem of excessive profits created by legal or governmental privileges. And he’s also 
correct to note that the lending of money or property can be a source of economic rent. But 
he gets the directionality wrong. Rent does not necessarily stem from the wealthy “letting” 
the less wealthy have access to their property. They come as well from the state permitting 
individuals to have exclusive property protections over commodities such as software, 
pharmaceutical drugs and land. Gates may be right that we have relatively few people on the 
Fortune 400 list whose wealth can be traced to eighteenth-century landholdings. But surely he 
does not need to look too far to find individuals whose fortunes are rooted in intellectual 
property protections.  
What actually distinguishes today’s tech billionaires from eighteenth or nineteenth-
century land owners? The answer may be more uncomfortable for Gates than he admits.  
In the nineteenth century, patents were seen as a worrying source of rentier income. 
They were condemned as an infringement of free trade. Today, while such views are still 
audible, they tend to linger outside the economics mainstream. As Andrew Sayer has pointed 
out, concepts such as ‘unearned income’ ‘functionless investors’ and ‘improperty’ – highly 
politicized terms that were far more commonly used in earlier decades – ‘have fallen out of 
use over the last 40 years – just at the time they were becoming more relevant.’ii Although 
Piketty mentions the concept of ‘rentier’ throughout his book, his treatment of capital doesn’t 
offer a means to disaggregate rentier income.  
 
Conclusion: blame the absent data   
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I have drawn on a specific historical example – Clark’s development of a theory of the 
marginal productivity of income distribution – in order to explore the historical roots of 
cultural maxims that are pervasive in western societies: incomes reflect talent; top managers 
deserve top pay; hard work pays off.  
I have discussed a peculiar triumph of Clark’s theory – the fact that it thrives today 
despite being castigated for decades by mainstream and heterodox scholars for its naivety.  
By shedding light on the curious longevity of Clark’s disputed theory, this article 
contributes to a perennial question raised by economic sociologists: why do economic 
theories that have long been dismissed by leading economists on both sides of the political 
spectrum continue to be taught and retaught as if they are universally true? Or to quote the 
economists Yanis Varoufakis and Christian Arnsperger, “how does mainstream economics 
get away with it?” (2009: 15; see also Gross and McGoey 2015). 
 One common response to that question is to accuse mainstream economists of simply 
ignoring countervailing evidence. This response is plausible. But it is also insufficient. To 
suggest that a dominant group simply ignores inconvenient evidence is to underestimate the 
effort, expertise and material resources needed to sustain the ongoing avoidance of 
uncomfortable truths.  
In the case I’ve detailed above, one of the most useful resources for individuals such 
as Mankiw who insist that rent-seeking is ‘rare’ is the absence of a strong theoretical position 
to prove them wrong. The dearth of data – fomented by the lack of a persuasive theory of 
value – is a source of authority. Piketty’s thesis is focused on ‘open’ data: evidence that lives 
in the databases of national treasuries or the offices of national statistics. His Herculean effort 
was to bring these databases together – and it is a major accomplishment. But, as Michael 
Hudson argues, it is a ‘value-free’ (and thereby value-laden from an STS perspective) 
catalogue of data: one that does not distinguish, and is incapable of distinguishing, between 
wealth is that is earned productively – through making economic contributions – and wealth 
that is extracted illegitimately through rent-seeking.  
The data that Piketty would need to study this important problem is not collected in a 
way that disaggregates ‘unproductive’ from ‘productive’ wealth. It is not just inaccessible: it 
was never there. One of the reasons why it doesn’t exist empirically is because generations of 
neoclassical economists did not see the need to generate it. And one reason for their lack of 
attention is because just over a century ago, a man named John Bates Clark came up with a 
‘law’ asserting that, under ideal market conditions, illegitimate rent extraction was an 
impossibility. And powerful people wanted to believe that he was right.   
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